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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

OSMAN HOME IMPROVEMENT;
UNITED STAFFING; CREDIT GENERAL INSURANCE,
Case No. 970406-CA
Petitioners,
vs.

Priority Number 7

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH; UNINSURED EMPLOYERS' FUND; ARNULFO STEVEN
SOSA; ENRIQUE SOSA,

Industrial Commission Case No.
951041

Respondents.

BRIEF OF PETITIONERS
PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH
All statutory citations are to Utah Code Annotated (1996) unless otherwise
stated. The 1997 Utah Legislature re-enacted the Workers Compensation Act.
The revised Act took effect July 1, 1997. The accident which lies at the heart of
1

this case occurred under the old Act, as did the adjudication of that claim.
Accordingly, we will refer to the Workers Compensation Act as it existed prior
to the 1997 re-enactment.
JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2a-3(2)(a) and 35-1-86 grant the court jurisdiction
of this appeal.1
ISSUES PRESENTED AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW
The only issue which the Petitioners present for the court's review is
whether Osman Home Improvement was Arnulfo Sosa's sole employer when he
fell off a roof on July 22, 1995.
The standard of review is correction of error. The facts are not in dispute.
Accordingly, the nature of the relationship between the injured employee,
Arnulfo Sosa, and Osman Home Improvment and Enrique Sosa is a question of
law which the Court of Appeals will review for correctness. BB & B
Transportation vs. Industrial Commission, 893 P. 2d 611 (Utah App. 1995).

Jurisdiction of appeals from the Labor Commission still rests with the
Court of Appeals under the 1997 re-enactment of the Workers Compensation
Act, Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-801(8).
2

The issue arose due to the Industrial Commission's decision to grant a
motion for review filed by Enrique Sosa and the Uninsured Employers' Fund .
That was a final Order and nothing further is required by the Petitioners, the
parties aggrieved by the Commission's decision, to preserve the issue for review.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1995) is the determinative statute. It is lengthy
and is reproduced in the addendum, Tab 1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is a workers compensation claim which the Applicant, Arnulfo (Steve)
Sosa, brought as a result of injuries he suffered on July 22, 1995, when he fell
off a roof. Mr. Sosa filed an application for hearing with the Industrial Commission of Utah on December 7, 1995. The application named Osman Home
Improvement as Mr. Sosa's employer. At the request of the Petitioners, the
Industrial Commission added Enrique Sosa and the Uninsured Employers Fund
as additional parties defendant.
On November 25, 1996, one of the Commission's administrative law
judges conducted an evidentiary hearing. On January 30, 1997, the ALJ issued
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her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, which concluded that
Osman Home Improvement was Arnulfo Sosa's statutory employer, that Enrique
Sosa was Arnulfo's common law employer, and that they were jointly liable for
the payment of workers compensation benefits to Steve Sosa. Enrique Sosa had
no workers compensation insurance. The ALJ found that he was unable to pay
Arnulfo Sosa's workers compensation benefits and ordered the Uninsured
Employers Fund to pay Enrique Sosa's share.
The Uninsured Employers Fund and Enrique Sosa moved for review of the
ALJ's order. The Industrial Commission granted that motion, concluding that
Enrique was not Steve's employer and that Osman Home Improvement was his
sole employer. The Petitioners appeal the Commission's decision to this Court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Petitioners do not dispute that Arnulfo Sosa was hurt in a compensable
industrial accident on July 22, 1995, and that he is entitled to compensation and
benefits under the Utah Workers Compensation Act.2 They part ways with the
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The Petitioners also no not dispute that Osman failed to obtain a certificate
of workers compensation insurance, per §35-l-42(6)(e), and, accordingly, is a
statutory employer under §35-l-42(6)(a).
4

Commission, the Uninsured Employers Fund and Enrique Sosa on the issue of
whether Enrique Sosa was Arnulfo Sosa's employer when he fell off the roof,
and that is the issue which they ask the Court to decide.
The fact that two of the parties have the same last name can be confusing.
For purposes of clarity, we will refer to Arnfiilfo Sosa by his nickname, Steve,
and Enrique Sosa by his given name.
The Petitioners do not dispute the Commission's findings of fact. The
statement of facts which follows is a recitation of the Commission's findings,
augmented by the testimony of Steve and Enrique Sosa.
1. In the summer of 1995, Osman Home Improvement ("Osman") had a
contract to install roofing and to waterproof decks and breezeways on new
apartment buildings on 90th South in Sandy, Utah. (R. 359, 174)
2. Enrique found out about the job when he read an ad in the paper that
Osman was hiring roofers. (R. 359-60, 157)
3. Enrique has been a roofer for 11 years who has worked for "practically
the whole State of California". (R. 146)
4. Osman furnished no tools. Enrique furnished all of the expensive tools
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to perform the job. That included a staple gun, nailer, compressor, Skil saw,
hoses and ladders. (R. 360, 154)
5. Steve, on the other hand, provided a hammer, a pouch and a rope. (R.
132)
6. Osman agreed to pay Enrique $14 per square3 to install felt4 and
shingles on the roofs of the apartments. (R. 360, 152)
7. Enrique set his own hours. He testified that he could work five days a
week, four days a week or seven days a week. (R. 360, 139) Steve was under
the impression that he and Enrique could decide which days they wanted to work.
(R. 125)
9. Enrique told Steve about the job he had with Osman. (R. 360, 108)
Steve testified that he met Osman some three weeks before his accident. Steve
recalled that when he met Michael Osman, the president of Osman Home
Improvement, Enrique said, "vThis is my nephew, and so is it okay if he comes
to work with me?' And asked him if I could work, you know, if I could work for
3

A "square" is the area covered by 100 square feet of installed shingles. A
roof of 1000 square feet would have 10 square.
4

"Felt" is tar paper which is applied to the roof before the shingles.
6

him - or us. I mean for Mike." (R. 116)
10. Enrique remembers that he introduced Steve to Osman and told him
that Steve would be working with him and that Osman sealed the agreement with
an "okay look". (R. 137). Note: According to Enrique, Osman said nothing to
evidence his assent. He merely gave Enrique an "okay look". (R. 8)
11. The Commission found that Steve's pay was negotiated between
Enrique and Steve. (R. 360). Note that Osman, the purported sole employer,
was not privy to that agreement. Steve remembers that Enrique told him he
would be earning $10 per hour because he would be getting $10 per square and
he would install about a square an hour. (R. 59) Since Enrique had contracted to
install the roofing at a rate of $14 per square, he stood to make $4 per square
from Steve's work.
12. Enrique, Steve's alleged co-employee, testified that he brought Steve
on as his apprentice and that he had absolute control over how much Steve was to
make. According to Enrique, he could pay the apprentice five dollars per hour
or he could pay him nothing. (R. 150)

7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Court should reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission
because Enrique Sosa retained and exercised absolute control over Steve Sosa.
As such, he was Steve's employer. Although Osman Home Improvement also
retained control over aspects of Steve's work, that does not vitiate Enrique's role
as Steve's employer. As noted any number of times by this court and the
Supreme Court, in workers compensation cases an employee may have two
employers. Steve Sosa had two employers when he fell off the roof on July 22,
1995.
ARGUMENT
ENRIQUE SOSA WAS STEVE SOSA'S EMPLOYER AT THE TIME STEVE
SOSA FELL FROM THE ROOF.
Under the Workers Compensation Act, an employer is any person who
regularly employs one or more workers in the same business, or in or about the
same establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied. Utah Code
Ann. §35-1-42(2). The critical factor which determines whether an employeremployee relationship exists is whether the putative employer retains the right to
control his prospective employee. BB & B Transportation vs. Industrial Com8

mission. 893 P.2d 611 (Utah App. 1995); Kinne vs. Industrial Commission. 609
P.2d 926 (Utah 1980). These cases also clearly establish that an employee may
have two employers under the Workers Compensation Act.

BB & B Transportation vs, Industrial Commission, 893 P.2d 611 (Utah
App. 1995) is on point with the facts of this case. It considered the liability for
workers compensation benefits where two entities controlled aspects of work
performed by a person injured in an industrial accident. In BB & BT as in the
instant case, the Industrial Commission assigned all of the liability for death
benefits under the Workers Compensation Act to BB & B Transportation, which
had leased a truck from one Mark Bundy. Under the agreement between BB & B
and Bundy, Bundy had the responsibility for hiring drivers, setting wages, hours
and working conditions of the drivers as well as for training and disciplining
them. BB & B retained the right to "request" that Bundy not use any particular
driver and Bundy had to comply with that request. The agreement between
Bundy and BB & B provided that the latter retained complete care, custody and
control of the driver and the exclusive right to dispatch the driver. The agreement required the driver to check in with BB & B each morning before 10:00
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a.m., Monday though Friday, and obtain BB & B's permission before hauling
any load. PhiUipson, one of BB & B/Bundy's drivers, was killed on the job.
The Industrial Commission found that BB & B was the deceased driver's sole
employer at the time of his accident. This Court reversed, noting that an employee could have two employers for purposes of the Workers Compensation
Act. BB & B and Bundy were jointly responsible for the payment of death
benefits to PhiUipson's heir. Both employers are liable under a theory that the
employee is serving both employers and is under the control of both.
In this case, Enrique Sosa takes full marks in the right to control test. In
every critical aspect of Steve Sosa's job, Enrique called the shots. Enrique
determined how much Steve would earn for his labors. Enrique dictated the
hours they would work. Although Steve provided his own personal tools, his
hammer, pouch and safety rope, Enrique provided the expensive tools - the
compressor, staple gun, ladders, etc.
Critically, Osman Home Improvement was not privy to Enrique's agreement with Steve regarding his wages. Indeed, the sole manifestation of Michael
Osman's alleged commitment to hire Steve was an "okay look" when Enrique

10

introduced him to Steve.

Osman did not dictate the hours that Enrique would

be at work. Although Osman provided the roofing materials, he supplied none of
the tools that Enrique and Steve used.
The Industrial Commission concluded that Osman had the right to control
Enrique. In that, the Commission was absolutely correct. Osman Home Improvement retained authority over the job including the right to fire roofers and
to require roofers to obtain its permission before hiring any assistants. That
retention of control renders by Osman does not negate the control which Enrique
Sosa retained and exercised over Steve.
As noted above, Enrique Sosa profited personally from Steve's labors.
Osman paid Enrique $14.00 per square and Enrique paid Steve $10.00, netting
Enrique $4.00 per square.
The Commission's order granting Enrique's motion for review ignored the
holdings of BB & B and Kinne. supra. An injured employee may have two
employers where each retains control and the employee serves both employers.
Steve Sosa had two employers. His first employer was his uncle, Enrique Sosa,
who made money from Steve's labors and who determined how much Steve
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earned, who set the hours Steve worked and who furnished most of the tools
Steve used. The second employer was Osman Home Improvement who merely
retained the right to control some aspects of Enrique's work. Both employers
had sufficient control to make them liable for Steve's workers compensation and
benefits.
The Commission concluded that Osman was Steve' sole employer. In
doing so it pointed to the fact that Enrique agreed to be paid on the basis of how
many squares of roofing he installed, and that Osman retained the right to fire its
roofers. Those factors alone do not necessarily make Enrique an employee of
Osman. In Graham vs. R. Thorne Foundation, 675 P.2d 1196 (Utah, 1984), the
Supreme Court upheld an order of the Industrial Commission that a roofer was
an independent contractor even though the general contractor paid him on the
basis of squares installed, furnished nails and roofing materials, directed when
the roofer would perform his work, told the roofer to cease work on two homes
and begin work on another, and dictated how certain minor aspects of the work
would be performed. Clearly, the fact that Osman agreed to pay Enrique by the
square and retained some control does not necessarily dictate that Osman was
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Enrique's employer, much less support the conclusion that Osman was Steve
Sosa's sole employer.
The mere fact that a contractor retains some right to control the work of its
subcontractors does not, and should not, render the contractor the sole employer
of its subcontractor's employees. Occupational safety and health laws require
contractors to police their subcontractors to insure that they comply with OSHA
regulations. If a subcontractor violates one of those regulations, both the
contractor and the subcontractor may be cited and fined for the safety violations
of its subcontractors. Secretary of Labor vs. Blount International, Inc.. 15 BNA
OSHC 1897, 1991-93 CCH OSHD 129,854 (OSHRC, 1992). Further, every
contractor has obligations to the owner or general contractor with whom he has
contracted. Among those covenants, typically, are completion dates, standards of
performance, etc. Each contractor must be able to require performance from his
subcontractors that will allow him to meet his obligations to the owner of the
project, or the general contractor. When a contractor requires his subcontractors
to start and finish their work by a specified date it should not mean that he is now
the sole employer of the subcontractor's employees.
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CONCLUSION
Steve Sosa had two employers when he sustained injuries on July 22, 1995.
The Industrial Commission committed error by focusing solely on the right of
control retained by Osman Home Improvement. The control actually exercised
by Enrique Sosa renders him jointly liable for Steve's workers compensation and
beneifts. This Court should reverse the Industrial Commission's order which
found that the Osman Home Improvement was Steve Sosa's sole employer and
determine that Osman and Enrique are jointly liable.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this |

day of October, 1997.

BLACKBURN & STOLL, L.C.

/ Um^c /Ml
Thomas C. Sturdy
\ y
Attorney for Osman Home Improvement,
United Staffing, Credit General Insurance,
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ADDENDUM

ADDENDUM

Tabl

Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1996)
Employers enumerated and defined - Regularly employed - Statutory employers.
(1) (a) The state, and each county, city, town, and school district in the state
are considered employers under this title.
(b) For the purposes of the exclusive remedy in this title prescribed in
Section 35-1-60, the state is considered to be a single employer and includes any
office, department, agency, authority, commission, board, institution, hospital,
college, university, or other instrumentality of the state.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (4), each person, including each public
utility and each independent contractor, who regularly employs one or more
workers or operatives in the same business, or in or about the same
establishment, under any contract of hire, express or implied, oral or written is
considered an employer under this title. As used in Subsection (2):
(a) "Regularly" includes all employments in the usual course of the trade,
business, profession, or occupation of the employer, whether continuous
throughout the year or for only a portion of the year.
(b) "Independent contractor" means any person engaged in the performance
of any work for another who, while so engaged, is independent of the employer
in all that pertains to the execution of the work, is not subject to the rule or
control of the employer, is engaged only in the performance of a definite job or
piece of work, and is subordinate to the employer only in effecting a result in
accordance with the employer's design.
(3) (a) The client company in an employee leasing arrangement under Title
58, Chapter 59, Employee Leasing Company Licensing Act, is considered the
employer of leased employees and shall secure workers' compensation benefits
for them by complying with Subsection 35-l-46(l)(a) or (b) and commission
rules.
(b) Insurance carriers may underwrite such a risk showing the leasing
company as the named insured and each client company as an additional insured
by means of individual endorsements.
(c) Endorsements shall be filed with the commission as directed by rule.
(4) (a) An agricultural employer is not considered an employer under this title
if:
(i) the employer's employees are all members of the employer's immediate
family and the employer has a proprietary interest in the farm where they work;
or

(ii) the employer employed five or fewer persons other than immediate
family members for 40 hours or more per week per employee for 13 consecutive
weeks during any part of the preceding 12 months.
(b) A domestic employer who does not employ one employee or more than
one employee at least 40 hours per week is not considered an employer under
this title.
(5) An employer of agricultural laborers or domestic servants who is not
under this title has the right and option to come under it by complying with its
provisions and the rules of the commission.
(6) (a) If any person who is an employer procures any work to be done
wholly or in part for the employer by a contractor over whose work the employer
retains supervision or control, and this work is a part or process in the trade or
business of the employer, the contractor, all persons employed by the contractor,
all subcontractors under the contractor, and all persons employed by any of these
subcontractors, are considered employees of the original employer for the
purposes of Chapters 1 and 2.
(b) Any person who is engaged in constructing, improving, repairing, or
remodelling a residence that the person owns or is in the process of acquiring as
the person's personal residence may not be considered an employee or employer
solely by operation of Subsection (6)(a).
(c) A partner in a partnership or an owner of a sole proprietorship may not
be considered an employee under Subsection (6)(a) if:
(i) the partnership or sole proprietorship secures the payment of workers'
compensation benefits pursuant to Section 35-1-46; and
(ii) the employer who procures work to be done by the partnership or sole
proprietorship obtains and relies on valid certification of the partnership's or sole
proprietorship's compliance with Section 35-1-46.
(d) A director or officer of a corporation may not be considered an employee
under Subsection (6)(a) if the director or officer is excluded from coverage under
Subsection 35-1-43(4).
(e) A contractor or subcontractor is not an employee of the employer under
Subsection (6)(a), if the employer who procures work to be done by the
contractor or subcontractor obtains and relies on valid certification of the
contractor's or subcontractor's compliance with Section 35-1-46.

Tab 2

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA,

*
*
*

Applicant,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION FOR REVIEW

v.
OSMAN HOME IMPROVEMENT,
CREDIT GENERAL INSURANCE,
THE UNINSURED EMPLOYERS'
FUND asd ENRIQUE SOSA,

*
*
*
*
*

Case No. 95-1041

•k

Defendants,

Enrique Sosa ("Enrique" hereafter) and the Uninsured Employers' Fund ("UEF") ask The
Industrial Commission of Utah to review the Administrative Law Judge's determination that Enrique
was the employer of Arnulfo Steven Sosa ("Steven") and therefore liable for a portion of Steven's
benefits under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act
The Industrial Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M.
ISSUE PRESENTED
At the time of his work accident, was Steven employed by Enrique or by Osman Home
Improvement ("Osman")?
FINDINGS OF FACT
On July 22,1995, while working as a roofer's assistant on a multi-unit apartment project in
Sandy, Utah, Steven fell and injured his feet and ankles. The parties agree that Steven's accident
arose out of in the course of his employment and that he is entitled to workers' compensation
benefits. However, Enrique and Osman each argue that the other was Steven's employer at the time
of the accident, and therefore liable for his benefits.
Osman, a roofing company owned by Mike Osman, agreed during 1995 to place roofs on
buildings comprising a new apartment complex in Sandy, Utah. Osman then advertised in the
newspaper for roofers to work on the project.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
ARNULFO STEVEN SOSA
PAGE 2
Enrique, an experienced roofer, saw Osman's advertisement and inquired about the work.
He did not submit a bid for the work, but instead, he and Mike Osman simply agreed that Enrique
could work on the project and would be paid a piece rate of $14 per "square". Enrique set his own
hours and provided his own-staple gun, compressor, saw, ladder and safety ropes. Osman provided
all the necessary roofing materials.
Osman did not inquire whether Enrique carried workers' compensation or liability insurance.
Although Osman was a licensed contractor and familiar with the requirement of Utah law that
contractors be licensed, Osman did not require that Enrique be licensed. In fact, Enrique has never
been licensed as a contractor.
Osman retained complete authority over the roofing project, including the power to dismiss
roofers at any time for any reason. Roofers who wished to use assistants were required to obtain
Osman's permission.
A few days after Enrique was hired by Osman, Enrique told Steven, his nephew, that he also
might be able to work on the Osman roofing project. Enrique took Steven to meet Mr. Osman and
asked if Steven could work as his assistant. Mr. Osman consented. Thereafter, Mr. Osman actually
observed Steven working on the project and voiced no objection.
According to custom in the roofing trade, assistant roofers are compensated for their work
by sharing in the piece rate earned by the experienced roofer to whom they are assigned. The
amount of such compensation is negotiated between the experienced roofer and the assistant.
Enrique and Steven agreed that Steven would be receive $10 per hour, to be paid from Enrique's
piece rate of $14 per square.
Enrique and Steven began work on the Osman roofing project on July 20, 1995. On the
morning of July 22, 1995, Steven was laying down tar paper on the roof of one building while
Enrique and another assistant were at work on the roof of a second building. Steven slipped from
the roof and suffered injuries to his feet and ankles for which he is now entitled to receive workers'
compensation benefits.
After the accident, Osman paid Steven for his work up to the time of the accident.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The ALJ's decision in this matter concludes that Enrique was Steven's direct employer and
that Osman was Steven's statutory employer, as that term is used in the Utah Workers'
Compensation Act ("the Act"). Enrique and the UEF challenge the ALJ's determination by arguing
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that Osman, not Enrique, was Steven's direct employer. This issue is significant because the Act
places primary responsibility for workers' compensation benefits on the direct employer.
Section §35-l-43(l)(b) of the Act defines "employee" as follows:
(E)ach person in the service of any employer . . . under any contract of hire, express
or implied, oral or written, including aliens and minors, whether legally or illegally
working for hire, but not including any person whose employment is casual and not
in the usual course of the trade, business or occupation of his employer.
The first element in the foregoing definition of employee requires that the individual be "in
the service of1 an employer. Utah's Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the phrase "in the
service of1 in Bennett v. Industrial Commission. 726 P.2d 427 (Utah 1986). There, the Court held
that "in the service o f equates to the right of control. In Bennett and in Young v. Industrial
Commission. 538 P.2d 318, the Court identified several factors which tend to establish control.
Those factors were the extent and right of supervision, method of payment, provision of equipment,
right to terminate, and whether the individual has other clients. The Court made it clear that the
foregoing factors are not exhaustive, but merely illustrative.
More recently, in Averett v. Grange. 909 P.2d 246,249 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court
has emphasized the importance of the "control" test in determining whether an individual is an
employee for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act:
In workers' compensation cases, this court has consistently held that whether
an employer-employee relationship exists depends upon the employer's right to
control the employee. . . . "It is not the actual exercise of control that determines
whether an employer-employee relationship exists; it is the right to control that is
determinative." (citations omitted.)
Osman attempts to characterize Enrique as an independent subcontractor and Steven as
Enrique's employee. However, the evidence establishes that both Enrique and Steven were
employees of Osman. Enrique was not independently established as a roofing contractor, but was
instead what might be termed a "journeyman roofer", moving from job to job with an assortment of
different employers. He maintained none of the trappings of an independent contractor, such as an
office, insurance, advertising, or even the contractor's license required of independent building
contractors by Utah law.
The fact that Osman did not put the work in question out for bid is also indicative that
Enrique was working as Osman's employee. Furthermore, Osman had unfettered control over all
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aspects of the project. He could discharge any of the workers at any time. Even individuals such
as Steven, serving as assistants to the experienced roofers, had to be authorized by Osman. Finally,
the fact that Steven was paid directly by Osman is also consistent with Steven's status as his
employee.
The Industrial Commission recognizes that Enrique and Steven provided their own tools.
That fact is not sufficient to establish an independent contractor status, particularly in light of the
custom in the roofing industry for both employees and independent contractors to provide their own
tools.
Under ail the foregoing facts, the Industrial Commission concludes that both Enrique and
Steven were "in the service of1 Osman. Consequently, Osman was Steven's direct employee at the
time of his accident and is liable for workers' compensation benefits stemmingfromthat accident.
ORDER
The Industrial Commission concludes that Osman Home Improvement was the direct
employer of Amulfo Steven Sosa at the time of Mr. Sosa's work accident on July 22,1995. Osman
Home Improvement and its workers' compensation insurance carrier, Credit General Insurance, are
therefore liable for the entire amount of Mr. Sosa's workers' compensation benefits, as those benefits
have been identified in the prior decision of the ALJ. It is so ordered.

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR REVIEW
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Industrial Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request
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